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This study aims to examine and analyze the effect of corporate governance and 
earnings management on expense stickiness. By defining small positive 
earnings or small earnings increases as the proxy of earnings management and 
divides the sample into earnings management (upward earnings management) 
and non-earnings management. This study uses a broad measure of corporate 
governance by extracting the main factors of corporate governance. The 
sample obtained is 251 company samples for earnings management samples 
and 133 companies for corporate governance samples and processed using the 
Multiple Linear Regression method using the regression model from the 
research of Xue & Hong (2016). The results showed that corporate governance 
can reduce the level of expense stickiness. However, the results of this study 
cannot prove that earnings management can reduce the level of expense 
stickiness, but this research proves that companies that do not indicate earning 
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1   Introduction 
 
In the accounting literature, cost behavior refers to the way costs respond to changes in activities and decisions. In 
general, the cost behavior can be divided into two, namely, fixed and variable costs, based on changes in the level of 
cost-driving activity. This categorization assumes that costs behave symmetrically (Ibrahim, 2017). Based on research 
conducted by Anderson et al. (2003), shows that moving costs are disproportionate or asymmetrical to changes in 
activity volume. The movement of costs is said to be asymmetric because the amount of increase in costs caused when 
there is an increase in activity is greater than the cost that decreases when there is an equal amount of decrease 
inactivity, this condition is known as expense stickiness (Noreen & Soderstrom, 1997; Cooper & Kaplan, 1998; 
Anderson et al., 2003; Xie et al., 2003; Calleja et al., 2006). 
Xue & Hong (2016) state that there are two points of view used to see the existence of expense stickiness, namely 
rational decision making and motivational. The first point of view considers expense stickiness as a result of 
management's decisions after considering the costs and benefits of each alternative. In the second point of view, 
expense stickiness is considered the result of management intervention that has certain managerial incentives in 
managing the company's operations. Previous studies have assumed that deliberate decisions and management doubts 
in cutting idle resources are the main reasons for the emergence of expense stickiness.  
When management faces uncertainty about future sales levels and the company bears the cost of adjusting for 
resource adjustments, management tends to delay reducing resources and believes the impact of the decline is 
permanent. However, it should be considered that management sometimes has its conflicts of interest and management 
cannot be expected to behave in an ideal manner as expected (Jensen & Mecking, 1976; Chen et al., 2007). Chen et al. 
(2008) said that sometimes selfish management behavior can cause expense stickiness. Healy (1985) found that to 
obtain high compensation, management made adjustments to company earnings. Sweeney (1994) found that in a state 
of pressure to avoid violating debt covenants, management also tends to choose accounting policies that can benefit 
management. Several studies indicate that to meet or increase the previous year's earnings, avoid financial reporting 
and meet predetermined estimates, management tends to perform earnings management (Burgstahler & Dichev (1997); 
Degeorge (1999)). Kama & Weiss (2010) provide evidence that companies to avoid loss or decrease in income, reduce 
stickiness from operating costs. 
Therefore, to reduce the power in pursuing management's interests, a corporate governance mechanism that is 
considered capable of controlling management behavior occurs when there is a separation between ownership and 
control parties. Corporate governance, to some extent, can support the suitability of objectives between management 
and principals, so that this maximizes company value. Supervision of the implementation of good corporate governance 
can reduce management opportunism while protecting the interests of principals.  
Research on expense stickiness has been carried out in many countries. However, research that examines the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management on expense stickiness is still very rare. Most of 
the previous research was only aimed at knowing the existence of expense stickiness. This study aims to examine 
whether corporate governance and earnings management can reduce the level of expense stickiness. In this study, the 
notion of earnings management used is different from previous studies. This difference is in the perspective and 




Earnings Management  
 
Some literature consistently shows that earnings management makes it possible to avoid reporting loss or decline in 
earnings, meet or beat consensus analyst forecasts, reduce taxes, and reduce the likelihood of debt covenant default. 
Burgstahler & Dichev (1997) find that earnings management helps in avoiding reporting small losses and decreasing 
income. Xue & Hong (2016) investigate earnings management incentives in avoiding reporting small losses and 
decreasing income or upwards earnings management that affects the existence of expense stickiness. Kama & Weiss 
(2010) reveal that companies that carry out earnings management show less stickiness in operating costs. Kama & 
Weiss (2010) reveal that companies that carry out earnings management show less stickiness in operating costs. Based 
on this explanation, the first hypothesis in this study is: 
H1: Upward Earnings Management pressure has a negative effect on the existence of Expense Stickiness 
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Corporate governance is a mechanism used to supervise and monitor management when there is a separation between 
ownership and control in a company. According to Larcker et al. (2007), the corporate governance mechanism is 
designed to solve agency problems that arise due to the separation between ownership and control in a company. Chen 
et al (2008) stated that sometimes, management's selfish behavior can lead to the emergence of expense stickiness. As 
a supervisor, good corporate governance at a certain level can reduce the appearance of expense stickiness. When 
management tries to improve cost control, good corporate governance is expected to facilitate the process and reduce 
the appearance of expense stickiness (Wan & Wang, 2011; Cornett et al., 2009). Based on this explanation, the second 
hypothesis in this study is: 
H2: Corporate Governance has a negative effect on the existence of Expense Stickiness 
 
 
2   Materials and Methods 
 
The approach of this research is quantitative. The population of this study is all companies except for the financial 
sector listed on the IDX in 2016– 2019. This study uses secondary data in the form of financial and annual reports 
obtained from the website www.idx.co.id and the company website. The research sample was taken using the purposive 
sampling technique, where the sample selection is based on certain criteria. The sample selection process is presented 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Criteria Number of Samples 
Companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in  2016-2019 432 
Companies that do not attach annual reports in Rupiah   (131) 






Number of companies used as samples 





Number of Observations for 4 Years (2016-2019) 
Model 1 
  EM Sub-Sample 













] =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1




𝛽3𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗  𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
] + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗ 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 …( Model 1) 
 
Based on the definition of expense stickiness, the negative sign of 𝛽2 in Model 1 indicates the existence of expense 
stickiness. 
 
Where:   
SGA  = natural log of total administration and operation expenses; 
REV  = natural log of revenue; 
DUM  = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the current year REV decreases (𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1< 1), and 0 
otherwise; 
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CAPR  = capital intensity, measured as the net value of fixed assets scaled by operating revenue; 
TOBQ  = growth rate, measured as Tobin’s Q  
 
To measure earnings management by determining companies that carry out upward earnings management by 
categorizing the data with two conditions, namely, data that report small positive earnings, and data that reports a small 
increase in ROA.  Based on research conducted by Xue & Hong (2016), in determining earnings management by 
categorizing the data into 2 categories, namely the upward earnings management sub-sample or earnings management 
sub-sample by looking at the results of the calculation of ROA: 0-1.5% and changes in Earnings divided by Total 
Assets: 0-1%.  Companies that do not meet these two requirements are a non-earnings management sub-sample. After 
determining the two sub-samples, the data are regressed using the regression equation Model 1. 
It is expected that the level of expense stickiness is lower in the earnings management sub-sample and the value of 
𝛽2 is significantly higher than that of the non-earnings management sub-sample. The value of 𝛽2  in the non-earnings 
management, the sub-sample is expected to be significantly negative due to expense stickiness. To measure corporate 
governance variables, based on the corporate governance indicators used by Xue & Hong (2016) as Table 2. 
 
Table 2 
Corporate Governance Indicators 
 
Variable Measurement 
Ownership concentration (FACT1)  
Shareholding of the largest shareholder The percentage of the largest shareholder 
ownership of the total shares 
Z index Share ownership by the largest shareholder is 
divided by the ownership of the second-largest 
shareholder 
Number of meetings (FACT2)  
No. of board meetings Number of board meetings in the financial year 
No. of Audit Comitte Number of audit committee meetings in the 
financial year 
No. of shareholders’ meetings Number of shareholder meetings in the financial 
year 
External governance (FACT3)  
Audited by the Big 4  1 for firms audited by big 4 firms and 0 
otherwise 
Nature of firms (FACT4)  
Central SOE 1 for firms whose ultimate controlling 
shareholder is the central government or its 
institutions and 0 otherwise 
Local SOE 1 for a company whose main controlling 
shareholder is a private party or an institution 
other than the government 
Percent of independent directors and board size 
(FACT5)  
 
Percent of independent directors The independent directors’ percentage of the 
whole board 
Board size The number of directors’ (including the 
chairman) 
Separation of chairman and CEO, 
management shareholding (FACT6)  
 
Separation of chairman and CEO 1 if the same person is chairman and CEO, 0 for 
separation, and 0.5 for uncertain or not included 
in the report 
Management shareholding Percentage of management share ownership. 
Management includes the CEO, president, vice 
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president, board of secretaries, and other 
managers who are reported in the annual report 
Same place (FACT7)  
Independent director works in the same place 
where the firm is located 
0 for different, 1 for equal, and 0.5 for 
uncertainty. 
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𝛽3 𝐷𝑈𝑀 ∗ 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
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𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 [
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡
] 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … (Model 2) 
 
Where: 
SGA  = natural log of total administration and operation expenses; 
REV  = natural log of revenue; 
DUM  = a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the current year REV decreases (𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡/𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1< 1), and 0 
otherwise; 
CAPR  = capital intensity, measured as the net value of fixed assets scaled by operating revenue; 
TOBQ  = growth rate, measured as Tobin’s Q (i indicates firm and t indicates year). 
FACT: score of each factor of corporate governance 
i: entity I; t: period t; β: Regression Coefficient; ɛ: Error 
It is expected that the value of 𝛽2 will be negative and significant due to expense stickiness. H2 is accepted if 𝛽3 is 
significant positive because good corporate governance can reduce expense stickiness. 
 
 
3   Results and Discussions 
 









 log [SGAt/SGAt-1] 32 -2.53 0.20 -0.05 0.46 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 32 -3.01 0.20 -0.06 0.54 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] 32 -3.01 0.00 -0.11 0.53 
DUM*CAPRi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 
32 -72.72 0.00 -2.35 12.85 
DUM*TOBQi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 




log [SGAt/SGAt-1] 972 -11.91 12.03 0.01 0.93 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 972 -10.09 3.02 -0.01 0.53 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] 972 -10.09 0.00 -0.08 0.55 
DUM*CAPRi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 
972 -4197.1 114.51 -4.92 134.94 
DUM*TOBQi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 
972 -43.23 0.32 -0.26 2.32 
CG SAMPLE 
log [SGAt/SGAt-1] 532 -1.20 0.99 -0.11 0.15 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 532 -0.59 3.02 -0.01 0.21 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] 532 -2.85 0.08 -0.03 0.14 
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532 -46.12 6.94 -2.52 6.41 
DUM*CAPRi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 
532 -856.29 0.38 -1.80 37.14 
DUM*TOBQi,t*log 
[REVt/REVt-1] 
532 -304.54 0.01 -0.70 13.29 
 
Based on the table above, it can be seen that the average value of income and expenses on the EM Sub-Sample and 
CG Sample has decreased during the study period seen from the negative value in the log [SGAt / SGAt-1] and log 
[REVt / REVt-1], and for the NON-EM Sub-Sample the average value of income and expenses has positive and 
negative values which indicate that during the study period the income in the NON-EM Sub-Sample has increased but 
experienced a decrease in expenses. From the statistical results of the three samples above, it is concluded that all 
samples have high variability. This can be seen from the magnitude of the standard deviation exceeding the average 
value of the three samples above. The results of the regression analysis for hypothesis 1 are in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
Results of Regression Analysis 
 
EM Sub-Sample 
Variabel β Std. Error t Hitung p value 
(Constant) 0.010 0.020 0.521 0.607 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.334 0.256 1.307 0.202 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] -0.185 1.452 -0.127 0.900 
DUM*CAPRi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.029 0.058 0.498 0.622 
DUM*TOBQi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] -0.239 0.578 -0.413 0.683 
R2 = 0.980    
Adj R2 = 0.977    
 
Non EM Sub-Sample 
Variabel β Std. Error t Hitung p value 
(Constant) -0.055 0.029 -1.896 0.058 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.866 0.106 8.151 0.000 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] -1.077 0.102 -10.583 0.000 
DUM*CAPRi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.001 0.000 3.950 0.000 
DUM*TOBQi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.009 0.013 0.701 0.484 
R2 = 0.115    
Adj R2 = 0.111    
 
Based on table 2 it can be concluded that upward earnings management cannot reduce the level of expense stickiness, 
because 𝛽2  in the research results show a value of -0.185 with a significance value of 0.900. Therefore, these results 
do not support agency theory which states that to avoid loss, management will perform upward earnings management. 
This result also does not support previous research (Xue & Hong, 2016; Hemati & Javid, 2017; and Koo et al., 2015; 
Liu & Lu, 2007) which found that earnings management has a negative effect on expense stickiness, which indicates 
that the level of expense stickiness will decrease if the company practices. upward earnings management. Although 
the results of this study do not prove the effect of earnings management on expense stickiness, the results of this study 
prove the existence of expense stickiness in companies in Indonesia by looking at the test results of the non-em sub-
sample which have a significant negative effect on expense stickiness. Based on the research results, it can be seen that 
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management, when under pressure to report good income, prefers not to reduce expense stickiness. The results of the 
regression analysis for hypothesis 2 are in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 
Results of Regression Analysis 
 
CG Sample 
Variabel β Std. Error t Hitung p value 
(Constant) -0.113 0.006 -17.412 0.000 
log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.259 0.031 8.441 0.000 
DUM* log [REVt/REVt-1] -1.269 0.191 -6.634 0.000 
DUM* FACTi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.011 0.002 5.814 0.000 
DUM*CAPRi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] 0.004 0.001 6.140 0.000 
DUM*TOBQi,t* log [REVt/REVt-1] -5.132E-5 0.000 -0.113 0.910 
R2 = 0.119    
Adj R2 = 0.111    
 
Based on table 3 it can be concluded that corporate governance has a negative effect on expense stickiness because the 
coefficient value of 𝛽2in the research results shows a value of -1,269 with a significance value of 0.000 and the 
coefficient value of  𝛽3is 0.011 with a significance value of 0.000. The results of this study support previous research 
from Xue & Hong (2016) which analyzed the effect of corporate governance on expense stickiness and found that 
good corporate governance has a negative effect on expense stickiness.  Calleja et al. (2006) explained that companies 
with a more stringent corporate governance system that maximized the interests of shareholders had a lower expense 
stickiness level. The results of this study also indicate that the emerging expense stickiness can be overcome by good 
corporate governance. It is hoped that corporate governance will be able to alleviate agency problems and withstand 
managers' incentives to advance their own interests at the expense of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Mansor 
et al., 2013; Mulyadi & Anwar, 2015).  
 
 
4   Conclusion 
 
The results of this study indicate that corporate governance has a negative effect on expense stickiness. This means 
that good corporate governance can reduce expense stickiness. This is because companies that have stickiness expense 
with the help of good corporate governance are able to align the interests of agents and principals.  This indicates that 
the necessary adjustments when there is expense stickiness, management rationally by considering costs and benefits 
and in accordance with the principal's interests. However, the results of this study failed to prove the negative effect 
of earnings management on expense stickiness. This shows that when management is under pressure to reduce costs 
when income decreases because of the incentive to avoid losses and decrease profits, management prefers not to reduce 
expense stickiness. The researcher realizes that there are limitations in this study regarding the proxies used by 
researchers that may not be precise. This research also only considers several factors that can affect expense stickiness. 
The suggestion for further research is to find a better way to proxy the earnings management variable so that it can be 
more suitable and to extend and expand the research period to increase the number of research samples. Subsequent 
research can also seek and delve deeper into the factors that can affect expense stickiness other than those used in this 
research.  
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